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Tiered Approach to Resilience Assessment
Igor Linkov,1,∗ Cate Fox-Lent,1 Laura Read,1 Craig R. Allen,2 James C. Arnott,3,11
Emanuele Bellini,4 Jon Coaffee,5 Marie-Valentine Florin,6 Kirk Hatfield,7 Iain Hyde,21
William Hynes,8 Aleksandar Jovanovic,9 Roger Kasperson,10 John Katzenberger,11
Patrick W. Keys,12,22 James H. Lambert,13 Richard Moss,14 Peter S. Murdoch,15
Jose Palma-Oliveira,16 Roger S. Pulwarty,17 Dale Sands,23 Edward A. Thomas,18
Mari R. Tye,19 and David Woods20
Regulatory agencies have long adopted a three-tier framework for risk assessment. We build
on this structure to propose a tiered approach for resilience assessment that can be integrated
into the existing regulatory processes. Comprehensive approaches to assessing resilience at
appropriate and operational scales, reconciling analytical complexity as needed with stake-
holder needs and resources available, and ultimately creating actionable recommendations
to enhance resilience are still lacking. Our proposed framework consists of tiers by which an-
alysts can select resilience assessment and decision support tools to inform associated man-
agement actions relative to the scope and urgency of the risk and the capacity of resource
managers to improve system resilience. The resilience management framework proposed is
not intended to supplant either risk management or the many existing efforts of resilience
quantification method development, but instead provide a guide to selecting tools that are
appropriate for the given analytic need. The goal of this tiered approach is to intentionally
parallel the tiered approach used in regulatory contexts so that resilience assessment might
be more easily and quickly integrated into existing structures and with existing policies.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The concept of resilience has become preva-
lent among scientists, engineers, and planners in a
range of disciplines in the socioecological fields (e.g.,
ecology, urban planning, flood protection, drought
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management) and across public domains (e.g., city
managers, state, regional, and federal officials). The
private sector, government, and society have consid-
ered its application to problems such as disruption
from climate change and the challenge of ecosys-
tem management (United Nations, 2015; Walker,
Holling, Carpenter, & Kinzig, 2004). However, the
term itself carries such a broad range of meanings
(Angeler & Allen, 2016; Gallopin, 2006; Quinlan,
Berbés-Blázquez, Haider, & Peterson, 2016) that it
can be difficult to validate or generalize what effec-
tive resilience means in practice (Moser & Boykoff,
2013). A diversity of definitions of, and underlying
rationales for, resilience can confound planning, im-
plementation, and monitoring (Larkin et al., 2015;
Linkov & Florin, 2016). In fact, it may be that dif-
ferent fields eventually adopt different conceptual-
izations of resilience, whether that be the ability to
rebound to a previous state, to fail gracefully, or
sustain adaptation (Linkov & Palma-Oliveira, 2017;
Woods, 2006). Nonetheless, the appeal of resilience
has persisted due to the perceived failure of risk
management with respect to some of the world’s
emerging challenges. Myriad tools and methods mar-
keted as resilience assessments now exist, but take
very different formats (Arnott, Moser, & Goodrich,
2016; Florin & Linkov, 2016; Nordgren, Stults, &
Meerow, 2016). Some are as simple as a check-
list, others are geo-spatial visualizations of quantifi-
able metrics, while still others are network model-
ing methods but. However, with no generalized form,
the last are custom built for each application. The
outputs of these tools are similarly varied, including
maps, scores, and performance–time graphs. Devel-
opers of the tools span a wide range of entities in-
cluding academic, private (e.g., consulting), program
sponsors (e.g., foundations and agencies), boundary
organizations that bridge across research, policy, and
practitioner realms, and users themselves. Potential
users include state and city managers, industry pro-
cess administrators, and utility operators, many lack-
ing the expertise to choose among the rapidly accu-
mulating products in this emerging field. There are
already several calls for U.S. federal agencies to im-
plement resilience, and the need for guidance on how
the various methods and approaches to resilience as-
sessment can be synthesized into a regulatory policy
will only grow.
We recognize that there is ongoing discussion
of the meaning of resilience and of the specific dif-
ferences between risk and resilience. For our part
we make the following assumptions: although several
approaches to risk assessment exist, the methods
adopted by U.S. regulatory agencies are largely
based around the risk = threat × vulnerability × con-
sequence model (National Research Council, 1983).
Whenever risks are identified in this quantitative
manner and actions taken to reduce risk, there still
remains residual risk. As such, resilience assessment
and management is, in part, an effort to address that
remaining known, but unmitigated, risk as well as en-
hance the overall ability of the system to respond
to unknown or emerging threats. One of the biggest
challenges to effective risk assessment and manage-
ment is cost. If a Tier I risk assessment indicates any
risks of concern, a Tier II or Tier III risk assessment
generally involves significant cost and time to collect
the relevant data. At the same time, once unaccept-
able risks are clearly identified, the cost to replace
products, harden the system, or change operational
procedure is also resource intensive. By integrating
resilience assessment with risk assessment, the risk
management requirements may be reduced or the
same process may also be used to identify resilience
enhancements that help manage residual risk. We
propose a tiered approach to resilience assessment
that can be integrated with similar tiered approaches
adopted by many U.S. regulatory agencies for risk as-
sessment in order to ease the way for policy develop-
ment, open a pathway to more widespread adoption
of resilience practices, and enhance the current risk
assessment processes.
We propose organizing resilience assessment
tools into three tiers to provide a structure that al-
lows regulatory agencies to incorporate resilience as-
sessment with existing risk assessment protocols. We
choose this framework because it is similar to tiered
approaches that initially allowed risk analysis to be
used for regulatory purposes (Özkaynak, Frey, &
Hubbell, 2008; WHO, 2008). In that implementa-
tion, low-level tiers are for screening and use tradi-
tional default-based deterministic methods for anal-
ysis. These are normally conservative, lower cost, and
most useful for identifying cost-effective and achiev-
able actions to reduce risk (USEPA, 2014). Progres-
sion from low tiers to higher tiers occurs when risk
is near or above accepted thresholds. The specific
conditions that result in high-risk scenarios must be
investigated to develop targeted risk management.
Higher-tier analytical approaches are also relevant
when decision stakes are high, success is a matter
of probability, and debate between options is con-
tested. Many regulatory and standards organizations
use similar strategies for risk assessment in order
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to balance risk understanding with cost. For exam-
ple, the American Society for Testing and Materials
(ASTM) provides a three-tier process for decision
making on selecting risk-based corrective action at
chemical release sites. If corrective action goals are
met in the Tier I analysis, no further work is needed,
if not, data needs for Tier II must be identified, and
so on (ASTM, 2015). The European Food Safety
Authority utilizes a tiered approach in toxicologi-
cal studies. Tier I assesses absorption toxicokinetics
and sensitive groups (in vitro genotoxicity). Only if
the food additive shows specific levels of availability
and toxicity is further study undertaken (Gott, 2012).
The U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) Handbook for the Seismic Evaluation of
Buildings consists of a screening phase, evaluation
phase, and detailed evaluation phase. At any tier, the
assessor can report deficiencies and recommend mit-
igation or proceed to the next tier to conduct further
evaluation to resolve uncertainty (FEMA, 1998). The
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has
identified a three-tier approach to evaluate risk asso-
ciated with proposed changes to plant-specific techni-
cal specifications. Tier I assesses change in core dam-
age frequency, Tier II identifies potentially high-risk
configurations, and, if necessary, Tier III guides de-
velopment of a risk management program (USNRC,
2009).
Similarly, resilience can be investigated in a
tiered manner. We present a framework to orga-
nize the various quantitative resilience assessment
methods that are available for local, regional, na-
tional, and global agencies seeking to reduce risk
and enhance recovery capacity from risk events.
We describe how this framework can contribute
to practical ways for resource managers to assess
changes in resilience now. An outline of this ap-
proach has been presented in the International Risk
Governance Council Resource Guide on Resilience
(Linkov & Fox-Lent, 2016). Here, we more fully dis-
cuss the role of tiers in resilience assessment and of-
fer a general approach to operationalize quantitative
resilience assessment for any discipline.
2. KEY FEATURES OF A TIERED
FRAMEWORK FOR RESILIENCE
ASSESSMENT
An overview of the tiered approach is shown in
Fig. 1. The goal of each tier is to describe the perfor-
mance and relationship of critical systems in order
to identify management options that enhance perfor-
mance in parallel with activities that reduce risk. The
methods of Tier I quickly and inexpensively identify
the broad functions that a system provides to human
society or the environment and prioritize the perfor-
mance of the critical functions both during and in the
time following a disruptive event. Analytically, this
framing and characterization analysis makes use of
existing data, expert judgment, and conceptual mod-
els. The methods of Tier II describe the general or-
ganization and relationships of the system in a simple
form such as a process model or critical path model.
Identifying sequential and parallel events in a dis-
turbance can reveal feedback processes and depen-
dencies that are the root of cascading system fail-
ures. The methods of Tier III build a detailed model
of important functions and related subsystems where
each process and each component of the system is
parameterized. The process can be halted at any tier
when enough information has been synthesized such
that actionable system investments or projects to im-
prove system resilience, given available resources,
have been identified by the decisionmakers.
The resilience management framework pro-
posed below is not intended to supplant either
risk management or the many existing efforts
of resilience quantification method development,
but instead provide a guide to selecting tools
that are appropriate for the given analytic need.
The goal of this tiered approach is to intention-
ally parallel the tiered approach used in regula-
tory contexts so that resilience assessment might
be more easily and quickly integrated into exist-
ing structures, as shown in Fig. 2, and with ex-
isting policies, as a cost-effective enhancement of
existing capabilities. We highlight these similari-
ties and differences for this purpose of making re-
silience assessment readily accessible for regulatory
agencies.
2.1. Tier I: Screening Level
2.1.1. Approach
A Tier I assessment establishes the role of par-
ticular components or actions of interest within the
larger context of community, industry, or environ-
ment. Regardless of the final question to be tar-
geted (e.g., select from alternatives A, B, or A+B),
it is critical to understand the larger system within
which a process or entity operates, including the ecol-
ogy, climate, infrastructure, policies, and human be-
haviors that govern the performance of the system.
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Fig. 1. Overview of tiered approach to resilience assessment.
Fig. 2. Integrated workflow of risk and resilience assessments.
Resilience is a property of functions and systems,
not features, and so at this level events will be con-
sidered through their performance within the over-
all system, not just their performance with respect
to a specific feature. For example, while one could
do a risk assessment of a reservoir, resilience assess-
ment should look at what function the reservoir plays
within a larger flood management, water provision-
ing, and/or environmental system and understand
what the performance or reduction in performance
of the reservoir might mean to the system as a whole.
Tier I seeks to identify the major social–ecological–
technological properties of the system and to pri-
oritize the critical functions. One aspect of Tier I
assessment is to consider not just direct threats to the
target system itself, but how disruptions in associated
systems may change the demand on the system of
interest.
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2.1.2. Methods
Existing tools useful for Tier I include screening-
level assessments based on resilience indices or
scorecards developed from formalized libraries of
existing metrics or surveys (e.g., Cutter, Burton, &
Emrich, 2010; Nemec et al., 2014; NOAA, 2007;
Flanagan, Gregory, Hallisey, Heitgerd, & Lewis,
2011; Peacock et al., 2010; Sands, 2015; Williams
et al., 2014). In general, Tier I approaches should
help the user organize existing information and data
to provide a big-picture view of the system. The
appropriate tools have the following characteristics:
simple system representation, easy consensus on ma-
jor criteria from stakeholders, retrospective in con-
sidering historical records, and conservative in as-
sumptions about the future. However, Tier I ap-
proaches rely on simple screening models or indi-
cators of a system and so methods should be care-
fully selected based on the stated goal or intent of the
developers (Bakkensen, Fox-Lent, Read, & Linkov,
2017).
2.1.3. Outcomes
In a Tier I risk assessment, a survey of poten-
tial risks is compared to accepted thresholds to de-
termine whether further analysis is required. Here,
the results of Tier I resilience tools are often rel-
ative rather than absolute, whether relative to a
similar location that used the same assessment, or rel-
ative to the same location at a previous point in time.
Thresholds for “good” and “bad” resilience perfor-
mance do not yet exist, but if the output indicates
that the system already performs better than some
statistically determined portion of the country, or
shows improvement over a previous assessment by
some acceptable amount, further analysis may be de-
termined to be unnecessary or a lower priority. The
main goal of Tier I, however, is to identify and priori-
tize the critical functions of the system. Whether fur-
ther analysis is needed or not, Tier I assessments help
decisionmakers identify “easy wins,” or investments
in some part of the system that can significantly im-
prove overall resilience and that come at minimal
cost or debate. If it is determined that further action
is needed in order to identify controlling processes
and the efficacy of management actions, Tier I as-
sessments help pare down the sectors to just those
critical system functions to be maintained during and
following a disruptive event and are taken forward
into the Tier II analysis. Once this approach is used
to identify the critical functions and their relationship
to other features in the system, the effort in Tiers II
or III could be used to examine management alter-
natives in more detail.
2.2. Tier II: Process Flow Model
2.2.1. Approach
Tier II introduces descriptions of the structure
of the system. These might be simple process dia-
grams or flowcharts that indicate some relationship
between system components in time or space and de-
scribe major feedbacks within the system or connec-
tions to other systems. The Tier I outputs can be used
to determine what can be left out of further modeling
efforts but still allow evaluation of the salient parts of
alternative projects in Tier II. (A similar determina-
tion can be done when moving from Tier II to Tier
III.) Any model is necessarily imperfect and incom-
plete; the Tier II model should be useful to identify
bottlenecks when the demand on, or resources of, a
component of the system is stressed. The model de-
veloped in this phase attempts to reduce the use of
conservative estimates and instead increase fidelity in
terms of representing infrastructure systems, ecosys-
tems, and social institutions. Of course, introducing
a more realistic model can also raise issues regarding
how these components are represented; some obser-
vational data should be available at this stage for a
simple validation of the model.
2.2.2. Methods
Tier II tools may include matrices of resilience
performance that utilize metrics from Tier I ap-
proaches but disaggregate them into subdomains and
time stages such as the Functional Resonance Anal-
ysis Method (FRAM) (Hollnagel, 2012) or the Re-
silience Matrix (Fox-Lent, Bates, & Linkov, 2015).
Decision analysis methods, such as multicriteria de-
cision analysis and other structured decision ap-
proaches, provide an appropriate set of tools to eval-
uate scenarios, allowing an understanding of how
change leads to gains or losses in the system and the
impact (or lack thereof) from a particular investment
(Linkov & Moberg, 2011). The sequence of assess-
ment from Tier I to Tier II provides transparency and
documentation so that any conclusions from the stud-
ies can be understood in light of what the model did
and did not include and the reasons for those model-
ing choices.
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2.2.3. Outcomes
The primary outcome of Tier II is a model that
reveals the structure of the system and its interre-
lated components to support comparison of projects
or investments to improve resilience. Some scenario
analysis of potential future events can be performed,
where stakeholders and experts define how man-
agement or policy scenarios are selected and how
specific environmental and community parameters
are integrated and weighted to describe system re-
sponses (such as by Thorisson, Lambert, Cardenas,
& Linkov, 2017). Such a model can be used to com-
pare resilience management alternatives that are not
mutually exclusive to obtain the best outcome across
the system. This may be sufficient to initiate the re-
silience improvement process or make investment
decisions for currently available funding. If the par-
allel Tier II risk assessment determines that signif-
icant residual risk remains but that the degree of
uncertainty undermines the utility of a Tier II assess-
ment, the system-wide resilience strategies will en-
hance overall performance beyond what would be
obtained simply through risk mitigation measures.
To determine whether additional work is warranted,
a data assessment may also be carried out in order to
verify data availability and fitness for purpose (qual-
ity). This can be done in concert with any data as-
sessment necessary for a Tier III risk assessment. As
with risk analysis, a trade-off evaluation between the
cost of new data collection and the benefit of the re-
silience assessment is performed to set the analysis
boundaries.
2.3. Tier III: Networked System
2.3.1. Approach
As is often the case in risk assessment, the user
might frequently stop after Tier II and only move
on to the time and effort of Tier III when the sit-
uation is appropriately complex or variable, or un-
certainty high enough that the learning in Tier II
is insufficient to inform any actions. Tier III mod-
els seek to provide the highest fidelity in model-
ing a real-world system and thus observe the spe-
cific conditions under which risks arise or critical
function performance drops. Thus, it is rarely use-
ful or necessary to construct Tier III models to ex-
amine current or normal operating situations, in-
stead it is “conditional” performance (Fig. 2) under
emerging or extreme conditions that are of inter-
est. At this tier, the analysis can be very similar, if
not coincident with, a Tier III risk assessment. The
approach should consider interactions in ecological
and technological components of the system along
with an analysis of the impact of management deci-
sions on affected social institutions and vulnerable
populations (Moser & Ekstrom, 2010). Here, a full
range of scenarios can be tested to better under-
stand system performance in an uncertain future, as
the model only requires the mode of failure, not the
cause. Tier III can be prospective in predicting the
performance of different system configurations un-
der chronic and episodic disturbance.
2.3.2. Methods
Possible approaches include system dynamics,
graph theory, Bayesian networks, and agent-based
models (Boston, Liu, Jacques, & Mitrani-Reiser,
2014; Ganin et al., 2016, 2017; Gao, Barzel, &
Barabási, 2016; Schultz & Smith, 2016) that allow
scenario analysis as well as Monte Carlo simulation
to support sensitivity analysis. While many system
managers may prefer to have the information pro-
vided by a high-quality Tier III model before mak-
ing decisions, the time, cost, and data requirements
frequently make this infeasible, and following the se-
quence of performing a Tier I and Tier II assessment
may provide enough relevant insight to act.
2.3.3. Outcomes
The goal of a Tier III assessment is to reveal—to
the extent possible—the risk to sustained critical
function performance to the level that effective risk
management plans can be developed. Ideally, this
process also includes modeling of the postdisruption
recovery process in order to identify intervention
opportunities that reduce downtime and the poten-
tial for spillover impacts to other systems. Either
sensitivity analysis or scenario analysis can provide
a range of potential performance results so that
resilience interventions that are robust to a range
of possible futures can be developed. In this way,
the modeling and use requirements for Tier III re-
silience assessment merge with those for Tier III risk
assessment.
3. DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In risk assessment, the approach is primarily
sequential: first a risk assessment is performed,
then risk management strategies are developed. In
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resilience assessment, we believe that management
alternatives can be considered iteratively through
each stage in the analysis to reduce unnecessary anal-
ysis that is not directly associated with management
actions. Globally or nationally accepted thresholds
to characterize high or low resilience do not yet exist,
but that does not constrain the regulatory community
from early support for resilience assessment efforts.
While this may seem like a departure from common
regulatory implementations of risk assessment, a
prime consideration for any new approach to assess
and manage risks to infrastructural and natural sys-
tems is how such an approach interfaces with existing
regulatory and policy requirements and capabilities.
Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21, 2013) and
Executive Order 13636 (EO-13636, 2013) required
agencies in the U.S. federal government to explore
resilience within various risk management activities
pertaining to critical infrastructure. Rather than
proposing tiered resilience as a stand-alone, fully
novel concept, we argue instead that such a method
works as a complement to existing risk management
tools and capacities in many agencies. This should
help streamline the resilience adoption process, drive
the call for new tools to fill gaps in complexity and
system learning, and will reduce the overall burden
of these executive guidelines.
The tiered resilience approach can integrate
work from the many agencies, organizations, and
researchers who have built resilience indices, visual-
ization tools, and modeling methods. For a relatively
simple system, significantly improved resilience may
be achievable with a smaller toolbox where indices
are sufficient to describe the system and potential
vulnerabilities, and conservative estimates can
address the uncertainties (see Quinlan et al., 2016;
Rosati, Touzinsky, & Lillycrop, 2015 for a review of
methods). Considerations of funding and time re-
main lower in Tier I as compared with Tier III, where
a more complex system may require probabilistic
and modeling across a range of future scenarios
as well as cross-disciplinary analysis (e.g., Ayyub,
2014; Boston et al., 2014; Ganin et al., 2016; Kott &
Linkov, 2018). To supplement, rather than duplicate,
risk assessment, resilience may be best assessed with
nonprobabilistic methods, for example, possibility
theory (Dubois & Prade, 2012; Schafer, 1987). The
emphasis is on the fact that the main event will
happen given an indefinite time horizon; the actual
probability of this event is not the driving concern for
resilience management. We recommend that adap-
tive management approaches (Allen & Garmestani,
2015) inform all tiers, allowing for management of
the system while systematically reducing uncertain-
ties regarding system response to both management
change and system disruptions. This perspective may
also prove valuable to agencies and organizations at
all levels. Lacking standards, user input should be
explicitly integrated to maximize the utility of an as-
sessment. Managers and experts are needed in more
advanced analysis to accurately describe the system
organization and performance. Stakeholders can
identify goals, priorities, and acceptable tradeoffs
in performance (Cauffman, 2015) and thus guide
resilience management toward effective and efficient
solutions.
The benefits of the tiered approach are that each
tier has a set of actionable items, but users can also
move incrementally between the tiers as more de-
tailed analysis is needed. Users can assess their sys-
tem at each level, incorporate available data and
stakeholder input on acceptability of performance,
and then determine if the model employed is suffi-
ciently accurate to describe the system and scenario.
The tiered approach enables users to extract a range
of responses from basic but practical, to sophisticated
and predictive, in an effort to quantify the tactical
steps needed to enhance resilience. Groups that seek
an integrated strategy for assessing and communicat-
ing resilience, one that incorporates science into de-
cision making while working with limited funding,
data, and timelines, may find this tiered approach
yields a practical means of addressing pressing issues
in a changing climate.
We acknowledge that many questions still
remain. Uncertainty is a key driver in selecting risk
analysis tools and the tiered structure for risk anal-
ysis helps to provide formal guidance to balance the
cost of assessment against the potential reduction in
uncertainty to find a practical management strategy.
In the approach presented here, we view resilience
management through a framework for making
decisions on how to maintain critical functions and
services during and after a disruptive event, but it
will be a feature of the methods adopted at each
tier to manage uncertainty. The lack of quantitative
guidance on when is it appropriate to move to the
next tier of analysis is also a limitation; however,
we believe that by adopting a tiered framework for
resilience assessment, regulatory agencies can signal
the need for specific methods to address existing
gaps in tool availability and to have the output of the
tools align such that thresholds for acceptable and
unacceptable resilience can be developed. Though
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such an approach may not be immediately applica-
ble to all regulatory agencies in the United States
and elsewhere, it does interface well with existing
capacities and requirements for traditional risk
management for several organizations in a manner
that allows for an iterative and adaptive approach to
system resilience analysis within an environment of
uncertainty and potentially shifting priorities.
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